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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a framework for modelling legislative delib-
eration in the form of dialogues. Roughly, in legislative dialogues
coalitions can dynamically change and propose rule-based theo-
ries associated with different utility functions, depending on the
legislative theory the coalitions are trying to determine.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Applied computing→ Law, social and behavioral sciences;
Law.
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1 INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates how to model legislative deliberation in-
volving coalitions which express public interests. We follow [3],
which proposed a framework for moral dialogues, and we show
how that work can be easily extended to legislation procedures.
We assume that the legislative procedure can be analysed into
two different components: deliberation—the preparatory process of
legislation, which runs in the form of a dialogue involving coalitions
of agents—and voting [for a critique of this distinction, see 12].
Informally, the idea of legislative dialogue is thus the following:
• Given an initial theory T0—i.e., the current legislative corpus or
a part of it—coalitions propose the theory that amends T0 and
that they would prefer;
• Each theory is associated with an utility that measures the impact
of the proposed changes given the utility of T0; the intended
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reading is in terms of the consequence for the society if all agents
would conform to such norms [8];
• Coalitions deliberate in a different way depending on which of
the above theories are employed to compute the utility;
• We may have more rounds in which coalitions amend theories
proposed earlier;
• Coalitions are not fixed during the debate.
Several rationality criteria can guide the legislative dialogue
and the amendments proposed by coalitions. In addition to those
considered in [3]—such as maximin principle and Pareto efficiency—
we show how tomodel Kaldor-Hicks optimality and two constraints
for dialogues: maximising majority in coalitions, and minimising
changes in the revision of the initial theory.
While there is a large literature using argumentation for mod-
elling joint deliberation among agents [for an overview, see 1], to
the best of our knowledge no systematic investigation has been
developed combining means-ends rationality principles, theory re-
vision in the law and formal dialogues. The proposal of Shapiro
and Talmon [12] is a recent exception, which shares with us the
idea that the legislative process proceeds in rounds of deliberation
focused on editing a legal text, but the authors do not consider
utility criteria guiding the procedure; on the contrary, they analyse
voting outcomes—which we do not discuss here—upon a range of
conditions, including reaching consensus, a Condorcet-winner, a
time limit, or a stalemate.
The layout of the paper is the following. Section 2 introduces to
basic concepts, such as legislative theory, legislative coalition, and
the coalition utility. Section 3 offers an analysis of some rationality
criteria guiding legislative dialogues. Section 4 shows how legisla-
tive dialogues work. Section 5 illustrates additional constrains such
as minimising legislative revision and maximising majorities.
2 BASICS
A corpus of legislative provisions in a given legal system can be
defined as a set of legislative rules, a set which we call a legislative
theory. In line with acknowledged literature (for a survey, see [2, 5,
11]), we assume a logic language from which it is possible to build
legislative theories. A legislative theory is thus made of a set rules
and a superiority relation over the rules.
Definition 1. A legislative theory is a tuple T = ⟨R, ≻⟩ where
R is a set of rules, and ≻ ⊆ R × R is a superiority relation over the
rules.
Rules have the form r : ψ1, . . . ,ψn ⇒ ϕ where r is a label identify-
ing the rule. When needed, we adopt the following convention: for
any rule r , A(r ) and C(r ) denote respectively the set of antecedents
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of r and its consequent. In the rest of the paper, a set of legislative
theories is denoted by T, and we may just say theory instead of
legislative theory.
The legislative deliberation process involves a legislative body of
lawmakers (such as the members of a parliament), which we generi-
cally call legislative agents, in short agents. During the deliberation
process, agents can dynamically form coalitions. Typically, at the be-
ginning of the deliberation, coalitions correspond to political-party
groups in the legislative body.
Definition 2. LetAд be a finite set of agents. A legislative coali-
tion in Aд is a subset of agents in Aд. The set 2Aд of all coalitions is
denoted by C.
For brevity we will often speak of coalitions instead of legislative
coalitions.
When legislative agents, i.e., the members of the legislative body,
argue about theories to govern their own society, they form coali-
tions proposing theories that represent social interests correspond-
ing to the utility resulting from such theories.
Definition 3. Let T be a set of theories, V an ordered set of
values (on which the social utility functions are computed), and C
the set of all legislative coalitions. A coalition social theory utility
distribution is a function
U : T →
∏ |C |
0 V.
Given a theory T and n agents, the function returns a vector of
2n +1 values, which define the value of the theory for each possible
coalition in Aд and where the first value, conventionally, indicates
the aggregated welfare for all coalitions. Thus, the overall coalitions’
utility corresponds in the vector to projection π0(U (T )), while the
value of the theory for any specific coalition i corresponds to the
projection on the i-th element of the vector,Ui (T ) = πi (U (T )).
In the remainder,Ui (T ) denotes the utility of any coalition i ∈ C.
Also, we abuse notation and write UC(T ) to denote the overall
coalitions’ utility, i.e., Uj (T ) where j = ⋃k ∈C k . Accordingly, the
overall coalitions’ utility corresponds in the vector to projection
π0(U (T )).
In line with ideas developed e.g. by rule utilitarianism, we can
determine what is the value of a theory (for each coalition, in our
case, and based on the context in which the theory is used) with
respect to some inference mechanism [see 7].
In particular, an approach to articulate the way in which utility
springs from any theoryT can be based on the utility of conclusions
that follow from arguing on T .
Let us first give a basic language setting. A literal is a propo-
sitional atom or the negation of a propositional atom. For each
literal l in a set Lit of literals and given a (possibly different) set
of literals {l1, . . . , ln }, we can define a function λ that assigns for
each coalition i in C an utility value, i.e., the utility that the state of
affairs denoted by l brings to i in a context described by l1, . . . , ln .
Definition 4. Let C and V be, respectively, a set of coalitions and
an ordered set of values. A coalition literal valuation is a function
λ : C × Lit × pow(Lit) → V.
If E(T ) = {c1, . . . , cm } is the set of conclusions of a theory T , then
a coalition utility can be given by agglomerating the values of all
conclusions:
Ui (T ) = F i∀l ∈E(T)λ(i, l, E(T )). (1)
where F i is a function/operator that agglomerates the individual
values with respect to a coalition i into a single value.
The agglomeration function F can simply correspond to the sum
of individual valuations with respect to any coalition i [8]:
Ui (T ) =
∑
l ∈E(T)
λ(i, l, E(T )). (2)
3 OBJECTIVES OF LEGISLATION
As any theory can be associated with a utility, we may identify
particular theories. For example, one may consider agents’ utility
optimal theories, i.e., theories maximising the coalitions’ utility,
or (strong) ‘Pareto optimal theories’, i.e., theories for which no
coalition can be made better off by making some coalitions worse
off, or ‘maximin optimal theories’, i.e., theories maximising the
utility of the worst off coalitions.
Thus we may assume that any legislative debate has the objec-
tive of leading at the end (for the voting stage) to the best theory
according to some rational standard based on utility considerations.
The following definitions adapt the intuition of [3] to the case
of legislative coalitions.
Definition 5. Let C be a set of coalitions. A theory T ∗ is a coali-
tions’ utility optimal theory in a set of theories T iff there is no
theory T ∈ T such thatUC(T ) > UC(T ∗).1
Definition 6. Let C be a set of coalitions. A theory T ∗ is a Pareto
optimal theory in a set of theories T iff there is no theory T ∈ T
such that Ui (T ∗) ≤ Ui (T ) for all i ∈ C and Uj (T ∗) < Uj (T ) for
some j ∈ C.
Definition 7. Let C be a set of coalitions. A theory T ∗ is amax-
imin optimal theory in a set of theories T iff there is no theory
T ∈ T such that mini ∈C Ui (T ) > mini ∈C Ui (T ∗).
Other notions of efficiency can be introduced in addition to
those in [3], such as Kaldor-Hicks efficiency [9, 10], which is very
relevant in domains such as law and economics. As is well known,
this notion claims to be more realistic than Pareto efficiency, since
it is extremely difficult to make any change without making at least
one coalition worse off. Under the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, thus,
a theory is efficient if those coalitions which are made better off
could in theory compensate those which are made worse off and so
produce a Pareto efficient outcome. This means that Kaldor-Hicks
efficient theories are Pareto optimal, but the reverse is not true.
Our formalism does not allow us to explicitly express the idea of
compensation, but if one Pareto optimal theory T ∗ exceeds the
utility for some (but not all) coalitions j with respect to another
Pareto optimal theory T 2, then one could view T ∗ as compensating
a loss for some j in T :
Definition 8. Let C be a set of coalitions. A theory T ∗ is a
Kaldor-Hicks optimal theory in a set of theories T iff, for each
Pareto optimal theoryT ∗ ∈ T, there is a coalition i such thatUi (T ∗) >
Ui (T ).
1Equivalently, we can say that a theory T∗ is coalitions’ utility optimal in a set of
theories T iff for all T ∈ T UC (T) ≤ UC (T∗).
2If T∗ would exceed the utility for all coalitions, then T∗∗ would not be optimal.
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Clearly, each Kaldor-Hicks optimal theory is Pareto optimal.
We can now formulate the general problem of a legislative theory
elicitation.
Given: a set of coalitions C and a set of theories T;
Find: the best legislative theory T in T.
The problem can be specified. In fact, one may seek a coalitions’
utility optimal theory, a Pareto optimal theory, a Maximin optimal
theory, or a Kaldor-Hicks optimal theory.
4 LEGISLATIVE DIALOGUES
A legislative dialogue is the process through which coalitions pro-
pose their normative theories with the aim to improve on the cur-
rent legislative corpus of provisions. The normative system result-
ing from the dialogue is taken to be justified and so it is suitable
for the voting stage.
Let us define two simple operations for amending legislative
theories. Here we consider two very basic operations [4, p. 165ff.],
but more refined revisions can be adopted without affecting our
overall framework [see 6].
Definition 9. Let T = ⟨R, ≻⟩ be a legislative theory.
The contraction of T with respect to a set R of rules is:
(T )−R = ⟨R − R, ≻′⟩
where R ⊆ R and ≻′=≻ −{(r , s) | r ∈ R or s ∈ R}.
The expansion of T with respect to a set R of rules is:
(T )+R = ⟨R ∪ R, ≻′⟩
where ≻′=≻ ∪{(r , s) | r ∈ R, s ∈ R and C(s) = ¬C(r )}.
Definition 9 identifies the legal ways through which legislative
theories can be amended: coalitions propose possible amendments
in dialogues.
Definition 10. A legislative dialogue (henceforth, dialogue) is
a sequence of legislative theories (Tk )k=0, ...K such that
• theory T0 is the initial theory;
• for every Tk , k > 0, there is a set of theories Tk = {T ki1 , . . . ,T kin }
where {i1, . . . , in } ⊆ C (i.e., theories individually proposed by
coalitions i1, . . . , in ) such that each T ki j = (Tk−1)±R (1 ≤ j ≤ n)
for some set R of rules;
• theory Tk+1 = Choice(Tk ), where Choice is a function that selects
theory Tk+1 out of a non-empty set Tk ;
• theory TK is terminal iff TK = ∅.
Definition 11. The set of theories Td proposed in a dialogue
d = (Tk )k=0, ...K is
⋃
k ∈{0, ...K } Tk .
We can note that theory Tk may be included in Tk , possibly
leading to some sort of equilibrium. However, we are not interested
in computing equilibria as we deal with principles and not with
moves as in standard game theoretic approaches. For this reason,
we rely on dialogues and not on games, though our dialogues may
be seen as mirroring such games.
A dialogue is sound if, and only if, the choice function is sound.
We concentrate on a few sound Choice functions, each of them
combining a well established rational criterion with legal ways in
which legislation can be amended. Rational criteria may include
global utility maximisation (following rule utilitarianism), other
choices are maximising coalitions’ utility choice, a Pareto choice,
or Kaldor-Hicks choice.
Definition 12. The choice function of a dialogue (Tk )k=1, ...K is
a coalitions’ utility maximising choice function iff any theory
Tk (2 ≤ k) is a coalitions’ utility optimal theory in the set of theories
Tk−1.
Definition 13. The choice function of a dialogue (Tk )k=1, ...K
is a Pareto choice function iff any theory Tk (2 ≤ k) is a Pareto
optimal theory in the set of theories Tk−1.
Definition 14. The choice function of a dialogue (Tk )k=1, ...K is
amaximin choice function iff any theory Tk (2 ≤ k) is a maximin
optimal theory in the set of theories Tk−1.
Definition 15. The choice function of a dialogue (Tk )k=1, ...K
is a Kaldor-Hicks choice function iff any theory Tk (2 ≤ k) is a
Kaldor-Hicks optimal theory in the set of theories Tk−1.
Example (Running example). Let us consider three fixed coali-
tions: coalition i1 representing people with high incomes because of
their high salary, coalition i2 representing those with high incomes
because of tax evasion, and coalition i3 representing those with low
incomes. Suppose the initial theory T0 comprises the following:
R = {r1 : UpperClass ⇒ RaiseTax,
r2 : TaxEvader ⇒ SeverePunishment,
r3 : LowerClass ⇒ Subsidies,
r4 : LowerClass, TaxEvader ⇒ ¬Subsidies,
r5 : TaxEvader ⇒ PoorCountry,
r6 : ⇒ LowerClass,
r7 : ⇒ TaxEvader}
≻= {⟨r4, r3⟩}
The conclusions of T0 are the following:
E(T ) = {SeverePunishment,¬Subsidies, PoorCountry,
LowerClass, TaxEvader}.
Consider, for example, coalition i2 and assume that the λ function is
defined as follows (we omit the literals that are not logically derived):
λ(i2, SeverePunishment, E(T )) = −10
λ(i2,¬Subsidies, E(T )) = −5
λ(i2, PoorCountry, E(T )) = −2
λ(i2, LowerClass, E(T )) = 0
λ(i2, TaxEvader, E(T )) = 18.
Hence, the overall utility of T0 for i2 is 1. Similarly, we could assume
that λ works for coalitions i1 and i3 such that the overall utility for
the former is 3 and 1 for the latter. If the global utility is the sum of
individual coalitions utility, the utility distribution for T0 is [5, 3, 1, 1].
What should coalition i2 do? Although it represents tax evaders
(leading for them to a significant positive utility: 15) and their being
free-riders, which makes poor the country, only slightly impacts on
them personally (−2), the overall utility is positive but small. Hence,
coalition i2 knows that T0 can be improved. This can be done, for
example, by directly working on rules leading to negative utilities,
i.e., rules r2, r4, r5 and r6. For instance, i2 could propose to amend
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theory T0 by contraction (T0)−{r4 } , i.e., by removing rule r4. Hence,
the overall utility of the new theory would be 6 for i2.
Of course, this is i2’s view but the other coalitions play in the
debate and work differently. Assume that the new theory T1 resulting
from the debate involving all coalitions goes against the interests of
coalition i2, since the final utility distribution is U (T1) = [8, 2, 0, 6]
(i.e., taxes are slightly raised for upper classes, tax evasion is more
severely punished, and public subsidies are raised for lower classes).
Suppose other revisions of T0 are obtained, such as T2 and T3 where
U (T2) = [6, 2, 2, 2] (i.e., taxes slightly raised for upper classes together
with public subsidies for lower classes and imprisonment for tax fraud
is lowered from 5 years to 3 years), and U (T3) = [7, 3, 3, 1] (i.e., a tax
evasion amnesty is proposed). If the coalitions’ utility maximising
choice is adopted then T1 is elicited, while the maximin choice yields
T2, and the Pareto choice results into T3. No If revision (T3)±R is
chosen and leads to T4, whereU (T3) = [7, 4, 3, 1], then we would have
a Kaldor-Hicks optimal result.
5 CONSTRAINTS ON LEGISLATION
In Section 3 we have identified some objectives of the legislative
procedure, if coalitions are assumed to adopt some type of means-
ends rationality. However, deliberative procedures usually also
assume that some basic constraints apply to them. We focus on the
principle of majority-driven debate and of minimal revision.
5.1 Majority-driven Coalitions in Legislation
We should notice that Definition 10 does not require that coalitions
are fixed in the dialogue, but simply that at each turn in the dialogue
some coalitions individually propose some revised theories. Hence,
if the legislative body works on the basis of the majority principle
as applied to the agents forming the coalitions, it is obvious that
such coalitions could change during the dialogue.
Definition 16. The choice function of a dialogue (Tk )k=1, ...K
is a coalitions’ majority optimal choice function iff any theory
Tk = T ki j (2 ≤ k) in the set of theories Tk−1 is such that |i j | > |Aд |/2.
In other words, a coalitions’ majority optimal choice ensures
that each theory selected at each turn is proposed by a majoritarian
coalition in Aд (since the size of the coalition i j must exceed the
half of the size of the set of agents). Definition 16 works with
simple majority, but other requirements such as supermajority or
unanimity can be easily implemented.
Example (Running example). Let Aд be the set of agents:
Aд = {aд1,aд2,aд3,aд4,aд5}
with the following coalitions:
i1 = {aд1} i2 = {aд2,aд3}
i3 = {aд1,aд2,aд3,aд4,aд5} i4 = {aд1,aд2,aд3,aд4}
Assume four additional theories with the following utility vectors:
U (T0) = [5, 3, 1, 1] U (Ti1 ) = [8, 2, 0, 6] U (Ti2 ) = [6, 2, 2, 2]
U (Ti3 ) = [7, 3, 3, 1] U (Ti4 ) = [7, 4, 3, 1]
If Pareto choice and coalitions’ majority optimal choice are jointly
adopted, the dialogue could run as follows:
• step 0: initial theory T0;
• step 1: T1 = {Ti1 ,Ti2 ,Ti3 ,Ti4 };
• step 2: T2 = Choice(T1) = Ti4 .
5.2 Minimal Revisions in Legislation
Finally, another constraint could also require to minimise the re-
vision of the initial theory, in order to keep legislative revision as
simple as possible. In theory revision for the legal domain the idea
of minimal change has been widely investigated [for an overview,
see 4, 6]. Here we simply focus on minimal contraction or expan-
sion with respect to the set R of rules that are removed from, or
added to T0:
Definition 17. The choice function of a dialogue (Tk )k=1, ...K
is a minimal revision choice function iff any theory Tk = T ki j
(2 ≤ k) in the set of theories Tk−1 = {T ki1 , . . . ,T kin } is such that
T ki1 = (T0)±Ri1 , . . . ,T kin = (T0)±Rin
and there is no Rim ∈ {Ri1 , . . . ,Rin } such that |Rim | ≤ |Ri j |.
Example. Consider T0 as in Example 4. For the sake of simplicity,
assume that that we only have two coalitions, i1 and i2 and that the
λ function is defined as follows for all coalitions: for i ∈ {i1, i2}
λ(i, SeverePunishment, E(T )) = −10
λ(i,¬Subsidies, E(T )) = −5
λ(i, PoorCountry, E(T )) = −2
λ(i, LowerClass, E(T )) = 0
λ(i, TaxEvader, E(T )) = 18.
The utility distribution is thus [2, 1, 1],
Suppose that coalitions are modelled through a coalitions’ utility
maximising choice function and imagine that Tk−1 = {T ki1 ,T ki2 }.
Consider that T ki1 is (T0)−Ri1 such that Ri1 = {r4}. Here the utility
distribution is [12, 6, 6].
Also, consider that T ki2 is (T0)−Ri1 such that Ri1 = {r2, r4}. In this
second case, the utility distribution is [32, 16, 16]. If we just apply
coalitions’ utility maximising choice function to both coalitions, it
is trivial to conclude that Tk = T ki2 . However, minimal change, if
adopted rules out this option, thus Tk = T ki1 .
6 OPTIMISING LEGISLATIVE DIALOGUES
The use of dialogues and their iterative nature suggests some differ-
ent (search) strategies to find an optimal theory in a set of theories.
6.1 Coalitions’ Utility Optimising Dialogues
For the terminal theory of a dialogue to be coalitions’ utility optimal
in the theories proposed in the dialogue, it is sufficient that the
dialogue has a coalitions’ utility maximising choice function whose
output theory Tk is always included in the proposed theories Tk .
Proposition 1. The terminal theory of a dialogued = (Tk )k=1, ...K
with a coalitions’ utility maximising choice function is coalitions’ util-
ity optimal in the set of theories Td proposed in the dialogue if for
any Tk , Tk ∈ Tk .
However, the terminal theory may not be a strict ‘improvement’
of T0. Therefore, one may consider dialogues to elicit coalitions’
utility optimal theories based on the idea of improving theories.
Definition 18. Let C a set of coalitions. A theory T ∗ is a coali-
tions’ utility improvement of a theory T iffUC(T ∗) > UC(T ).
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Proposition 2. A theory is a coalitions’ utility optimal theory in
a set of theories T iff there exist no coalitions’ utility improvements
in T of the theory.
An initial theory is not optimal if there exists an improvement.
Proposition 3. The terminal theory of a dialogued = (Tk )k=1, ...K
with a coalitions’ utility maximising choice function is coalitions’ util-
ity optimal in the set of theories Td proposed in the dialogue and it is
a coalitions’ utility improvement of the initial theory, if for any Tk ,
Tk ∈ Tk , and there exists a theory Tk which is a coalitions’ utility
improvement of Tk−1.
In other words, if there exists no improvement in a dialogue
then the initial theory remains the optimal theory, and a legislative
dialogue is not necessary to find the optimal theories.
6.2 Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks Optimising
Dialogues
Dialogues can be similarly tuned to elicit Pareto optimal theories.
Proposition 4. The terminal theory of a dialogued = (Tk )k=1, ...K
with a Pareto choice function is Pareto optimal in the set of theories
Td proposed in the dialogue if for any Tk , Tk ∈ Tk .
As the terminal theory may not be an improvement of T0, we
can consider Pareto improving theories, i.e., theories leading to a
utility gain, without any coalitions being made worse off.
Definition 19. Let C a set of coalitions. A theory T ∗ is a Pareto
improvement of a theory T iff Ui (T ∗) ≥ Ui (T ) for all i ∈ C and
Ui (T ∗) > Ui (T ) for some i ∈ C.
Proposition 5. A theory is a Pareto optimal theory in a set of
theories T iff there exist no Pareto improvements in T of the theory.
Proposition 6. The terminal theory of a dialogued = (Tk )k=1, ...K
with a Pareto choice function is Pareto optimal in the set of theories
Td proposed in the dialogue and it is a coalitions’ utility improvement
of the initial theory, if for any Tk , Tk ∈ Tk , and there exists a theory
Tk which is a Pareto improvement of Tk−1.
Similar results can be given for Kaldor-Hicks optimality.
6.3 Maxmin Optimising Dialogue
Similarly to coalitions’ utility and Pareto improving choice func-
tions, maximin can be accommodated in dialogues.
Proposition 7. The terminal theory of a dialogued = (Tk )k=1, ...K
with a maximin choice function is maximin optimal in the set of the-
ories Td proposed in the dialogue if for any Tk , Tk ∈ Tk .
Definition 20. Let C a set of coalitions. A theory T ∗ is
a maximin improvement of a theory T iff mini ∈C Ui (T ) <
mini ∈C Ui (T ∗).
Proposition 8. A theory is a maximin optimal theory in a set
of theories T iff there exist no maximin improvements in T of the
theory.
Proposition 9. The terminal theory of a dialogued = (Tk )k=1, ...K
with a maximin choice function is maximin optimal in the set of
theories Td proposed in the dialogue and it is a coalitions’ utility
improvement of the initial theory, if for any Tk , Tk ∈ Tk , and there
exists a theory Tk which is a maximin improvement of Tk−1.
6.4 Improving Majorities
We have previously mentioned that dialogues aim at maximising
majorities by reconfiguring coalitions during the debate.
Proposition 10. The terminal theory of a dialogue d =
(Tk )k=1, ...K with a coalitions’ majority optimal choice is majority
optimal in the set of theories Td proposed in the dialogue if for any
Tk , Tk ∈ Tk .
Definition 21. Let C a set of coalitions and i j , ik ∈ C. A theory
T ∗i j is a coalitions’majority improvement of a theory Tik iff |i j | >
|ik |.
7 SUMMARY
In this paper we extended Governatori et al. [3]’s framework to
the legal domain for modelling legislative deliberation. First of all,
we assumed that the legislative procedure can be analysed into
two different components: deliberation—the preparatory process of
legislation, which runs in the form of a dialogue involving coalitions
of agents—and voting—which was not discussed here.
The idea of legislative deliberation consists in revising the cur-
rent legislative corpus or a part of it, where agents’s coalitions
propose in a dialogue legislative theories that amends such corpus.
Each revision is associated with an utility that measures the im-
pact of the proposed changes. Several rationality criteria have been
described according to which coalitions deliberate.
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